“Can they search my phone at the airport?” White-collar defense attorneys and in-house counsel often hear this question from clients whose conduct may be under government scrutiny, even when the client is not personally suspected of wrongdoing, and whose ongoing job and personal responsibilities require overseas travel.

On September 17, 2026, in United States v. Alisigwe, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which covers New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, held that federal officers may manually search a traveler’s cellphone at the “border” (including an international airport) without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.¹ The Court, however, expressly left open whether more sophisticated forensic examinations of a cellphone may require individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.²

Background

The defendant in the case, Mr. Alisigwe, came under investigation for suspected use of fraudulent passports and identity theft.³

In 2019, as Alisigwe returned to the United States from a trip abroad, customs officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York stopped him and instructed Alisigwe to unlock his cellphone.⁴ The officer then “scrolled through Alisigwe’s cellphone and used his own cellphone to photograph images contained in Alisigwe’s photo gallery.”⁵ The gallery contained “images of other people’s names, birthdates, and social security numbers as well as bank account information and addresses.”⁶

More than two years later, as Alisigwe returned from another trip abroad, law enforcement again stopped him at JFK and “again manually reviewed his cellphone by scrolling through it and taking photographs.”⁷ They photographed a WhatsApp message in which Alisigwe asked whether another person had received “[a]nything for” an individual whose identity Alisigwe had stolen.⁸

Prosecutors eventually charged Alisigwe with federal crimes relating to alleged bank fraud and identity theft. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the two searches of his cellphone at JFK, finding law enforcement officers had sufficient suspicion of criminal activity to search the phones. Alisigwe proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted him. He then appealed.

The Second Circuit Decision

In its September 17 decision, the Second Circuit affirmed Alisigwe’s conviction. The majority opinion, joined by two members of the three-judge panel, went further than the district court, holding that no individualized suspicion was required.

By way of background, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits searches of property without a search warrant. A search warrant generally requires a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. In 2014, the Supreme Court held in Riley v. California that the search-incident-to-arrest exception generally does not permit officers to search the digital contents of a cellphone without a warrant. 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).

However, case law has also recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the so-called “border-search exception.” As the Alisigwe court observed, the “longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.”⁹ It explained that “[t]he border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country.”¹⁰

In addition, case law has recognized that some kinds of searches may be permissible under a showing of “reasonable suspicion,” a lower standard than “probable cause,” but which still requires law enforcement to articulate “a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal wrongdoing.¹¹

The Second Circuit majority held that the border-search exception applied to the searches of Alisigwe’s phones, rejecting both his argument that Riley required a warrant issued upon probable cause and the district court’s ruling (and a concurring opinion) that reasonable suspicion was required.

The Court noted that “[u]nder our precedents, no suspicion is required before the government searches a traveler’s property at the border.”¹² Searches of property “are made reasonable by that person’s decision to enter this country.”¹³

The majority did recognize that “reasonable suspicion” is required for “non-routine” searches of a person (as opposed to property) at the border. But it explained that “the label ‘non-routine’ should generally be reserved for intrusive border searches of the person (such as body-cavity searches or strip searches), not belongings.”¹⁴

That distinction resolved the issue for the majority. “Because a cellphone is property,” not a search of the person, the Court concluded, “our precedents establish that the government does not need to have reasonable suspicion before searching a traveler’s cellphone at the border.”¹⁵

The Court also rejected Alisigwe’s argument that Riley, which emphasized the privacy interests associated with cellphones, mandated a warrant.¹⁶ The Second Circuit acknowledged that cellphones contain “vast quantities of personal information” and “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”¹⁷

But the Court emphasized that “Riley did not address the border-search exception.”¹⁸ Riley concerned searches incident to arrest, which are justified by the risks of “harm to officers and destruction of evidence.”¹⁹ The border-search exception, by contrast, serves the government’s broader “interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects.”²⁰

The Court ultimately held that Riley “does not alter the precedents that define the scope of the border-search exception” and that a search of a traveler’s property at the border, “including a cellphone,” may be conducted without suspicion.²¹

The Court Left Forensic Searches Unresolved

The majority, however, expressly limited its decision to “manual searches,” i.e., a law enforcement officer’s physical review of a cellphone. The Court declined to decide whether “sophisticated forensic search methods,” such as “the off-site forensic analysis of the phone’s data,” might qualify as a non-routine search requiring reasonable suspicion.²² Another federal appellate court, the Fourth Circuit (covering Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas), has held that forensic searches at the border require law enforcement agents to “have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.”²³

Case Law Continues to Develop

Case law concerning cellphone searches at the border continues to develop in other jurisdictions. Other “live” issues not addressed by Alisigwe include whether a cellphone user can be compelled without a warrant to provide the device’s password. In addition, last year, DOJ filed federal destruction-of-evidence charges against a man who, when returning to the U.S. from the Dominican Republic, allegedly gave customs officers a “duress PIN,” rather than an “unlock PIN,” which resulted in the deletion of the phone’s contents.²⁴

Practical Implications

• Alisigwe underscores the broad authority to search cellphones, at least manually, at the border, in the Second Circuit. Proof that the traveler committed a crime or that the cellphone contains evidence of a crime is not required.


• At the same time, the border-search exception applies only to international travel, not to domestic flights.


• The Second Circuit left open the possibility that a higher standard of suspicion would be required for more intrusive searches, including of cellphones. Alisigwe does not address forensic searches of cellphones, nor does it resolve whether agents may access cloud-based data without a warrant.


• Clients and companies whose personnel travel internationally may wish to consider, in consultation with counsel, what sensitive information is stored locally on devices used for international travel.


• Clients and companies whose personnel travel internationally should also evaluate whether to enable auto-delete or similar features. If these features are unintentionally triggered during a border search, that could invite additional government scrutiny.

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¹ United States v. Alisigwe, --- F.4th ----, No. 24-960, 2026 WL 2751713 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2026).
² Id. at *11 n.9.
³ Id. at *1.
⁴ Id. at *3.
⁵ Id.
⁶ Id.
⁷ Id.
⁸ Id.
⁹ Id. at *1 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)).
¹⁰ Id. (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620).
¹¹ See, e.g., D.C. v. R.W., 608 U.S. 22, 25 (2026).
¹² Alisigwe, 2026 WL 2751713, at *2 (citing United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006)).
¹³ Id. (quoting Irving, 452 F.3d at 123).  
¹⁴ Id. (quoting United States v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 123 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015)).
¹⁵ Id.
¹⁶ Id. at *7
¹⁷ Id. at *8 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 386, 393).
¹⁸ Id. at *7.
¹⁹ Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 386).
²⁰ Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
²¹ Id. at *11.
²² Id. at *11 n.9 (quoting United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 140, 146 n.5 (4th Cir. 2018)).
²³ United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2019).
²⁴ Indictment, United States v. Tunick, 25 Cr. 499 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2025).

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