On June 29, 2026, a divided Supreme Court held that the statutory protection shielding Federal Trade Commission Commissioners from at-will presidential removal is unconstitutional. The decision is a landmark in separation-of-powers law, and its reach extends well beyond the FTC.

Overview

The case arose after President Trump, early in his second term, fired the FTC’s two Democrat-appointed Commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, without invoking any statutory cause. By statute, Commissioners may be removed only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Slaughter sued to be restored, and the District Court, relying on Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, ordered her reinstatement. The Supreme Court, on certiorari before judgment, reversed, holding that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the Constitution’s separation of powers.

From Myers to Humphrey’s Executor to Slaughter

The President’s power to fire executive officers at will has been hotly contested since the founding, but especially over the last century. The story starts with Myers v. United States, decided in 1926. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft confirmed that the Constitution grants the President “general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers.” Nine years later, however, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States carved out an exception for the FTC, reasoning that the agency’s duties were “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative,” and thus that its Commissioners exercised “no part of the executive power.” That premise did not withstand the test of time. As early as 1988, the Court acknowledged in Morrison v. Olson that the FTC’s powers “would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some degree.” And in Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, the Court reaffirmed Myers’s rule and pointedly refused to extend Humphrey’s Executor to “new situation[s].” By the time Slaughter arrived, all that remained of Humphrey’s Executor was its narrow observation that an agency exercising “no part of the executive power” need not fall within the President’s removal authority—a foundation the Court found could no longer bear the weight placed upon it.

Court’s Reasoning

Writing for a six-Justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts grounded the holding in Article II’s vesting of “[t]he executive Power” in a single President who must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Officers who exercise executive power must remain accountable to the President—and accountability, the Court reasoned, requires the power to remove them at will. The Court concluded that the modern FTC, which administers more than 80 statutes, promulgates binding rules, adjudicates cases, and sues on behalf of the United States, “unquestionably exercises executive power.” “If anything more is left of Humphrey’s,” said the Court, “we overrule it.” Justice Gorsuch concurred, warning that agencies now exercise vast legislative and judicial power that the President will effectively control, and urging that those functions ultimately be returned to Congress and the courts. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the Court disregarded ninety years of precedent and reshaped the federal government.

Implications for “Independent” Agencies

The multimember, bipartisan structure is no longer a constitutional safe harbor. More pointedly, there are no longer “independent” agencies in the sense that they are insulated from removal by the President. Principal officers who exercise executive power are now removable at will, and dozens of commissions—including FERC, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Merit Systems Protection Board—are likely to become functionally executive agencies. Agencies themselves survive; the Court severed the removal restriction rather than abolishing the bodies, so rulemaking and enforcement authority persist—now under presidential direction. The Court expressly reserved two areas: the Federal Reserve, by virtue of its historical lineage, and tenure protections for non-Article III adjudicators (like the Tax Court or the Court of Federal Claims).

Takeaways

Independent-agency leadership now serves at the President’s pleasure, so policy at these agencies may shift more sharply with each administration. Regulated parties should anticipate greater volatility and less insulation from partisan direction. The Federal Reserve remains protected for now, but the boundaries of that carve-out are unsettled. Further litigation over adjudicators, inferior officers, and civil servants is likely.

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